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English Polygamy Law and the Danish
Registered Partnership Act: A Case
for the Consistent Treatment of
Foreign Polygamous Marriages and
Danish Same-Sex Marriages in England
Jorge Martin*
Introduction
On October 1, 1989, Denmark became the first country in modem West-
em civilization legally to recognize same-sex marriages, officially calling
these unions "registered partnerships."' This bold piece of Danish legisla-
tion, the Registered Partnership Act (Partnership Act),2 represents a mile-
stone in the progression of human rights.3
The Partnership Act, however, raises the question of whether other
countries will recognize a marriage celebrated under that law.4 Imple-
mentation of the Partnership Act will affect other countries, especially
Denmark's European Community (EC) 5 neighbors, as married Danish
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Guadalupe Rodriguez Borja de Martin.
1. Sheila Rule, Rights for Gay Couples inDenmark N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1989, at AS. For
the balance of the Note I refer to these unions as marriages, since the Danish law
regarding those unions incorporates Danish marriage law by reference and, as a result,
the unions are effectively the same as different-sex marriages in Denmark. See discus-
sion infra note 80.
2. Lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Partnership Act] Act No. 372, June
7, 1989 [hereinafter Partnership Act]. See discussion infra part II.A.
3. In August 1993, Norway followed Denmark's lead by enacting a similar law. See
infra note 124 and accompanying text. This Note confines its discussion and analysis to
the Danish law. Denmark, like Great Britain, is a member of the European Community.
See infra note 143 and accompanying text. This Note does not discuss the immigration
concerns that would arise if Norway, which is not yet a European Community member,
were taken into account. The crux of the discussion and analysis of this Note, however,
would apply equally to the recognition of a Norwegian same-sex marriage in England.
4. This question also is important because Denmark's Partnership Act indicates
the direction of Western matrimonial law. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
5. TREATY ESTABLSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATy]
27 CORNUL INT'L LJ. 419 (1994)
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same-sex couples migrate to neighboring countries6 and seek the protec-
tion and legal enforcement of their matrimonial union. This Note
explores foreign recognition of marriages under the Partnership Act by
analogizing the legal recognition of foreign same-sex marriages to the
legal recognition of foreign polygamous marriages in England. The pres-
ent social and political situation for lesbians and gays in England indicates
an unwillingness to extend equal marital rights to same-sex couples.7 This
Note argues that England should, at a minimum, recognize Danish same-
sex marriages on the same terms as it recognizes foreign polygamous
marriages.
Part I of this Note surveys the history of polygamy law in England, the
current state of that law, and the status of English lesbian and gay rights.
Part II examines the details and effects of Denmark's Partnership Act, the
justifications for same-sex marriage laws and their foreign recognition,
and the status of same-sex marriage as an emerging civil right. Part III
expounds on the rationale for analogizing the recognition of foreign
same-sex marriages to the recognition of foreign polygamous marriages in
England. Finally, Part IV examines two important considerations in the
judicial analysis of a Danish same-sex marriage in England and conducts
both a conflict of laws analysis and a public policy analysis on a hypotheti-
cal case.
I. Recognition of Foreign Polygamy and (Non-) Recognition of Basic
Lesbian and Gay Rights in England
Polygamy, a widely regarded non-Christian form of marriage, 8 was for-
merly viewed by English courts with extreme hostility. Because the law was
committing an injustice on immigrants in polygamous marriages, however,
English courts dramatically altered the law to recognize such marriages
almost unconditionally. Today, English courts would likely treat a Danish
same-sex marriage the same way as they treated polygamous marriages
more than a century ago, by denying them legal recognition outright.
A. Polygamy In England
1. The Evolution of English Polygamy Law
Since England's early polygamy cases,9 the common law has struggled to
6. The EEC Treaty gives the workers of its 12 Member States the freedom to move
to other Member States. See infta note 131 and accompanying text.
7. The status of lesbian and gay rights in England is discussed infra part I.B.
8. But see discussion infra note 134. Although Christianity is not the only religion
professing monogamy, this Note on numerous occasions refers to "Christian" notions of
monogamous marriage because English courts repeatedly and expressly referred to
these concepts in their discussion of English matrimonial law.
9. Technically, most of the cases discussed in this Note involve "polygyny," where
one man has several wives, as opposed to "polyandry," where one woman has several
husbands. As commentators explain, however, the latter is so rare that "polygamy,"
which includes both polygyny and polyandry, is generally used to refer only to the for-
mer. SeeJ.G. COLLIER, CONELICr OF LAws 275 n.124 (1987); ALBERT V. Dice' &J.H.C.
Mo~ius, THE CONFLICr OF LAws 648-49 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 11th ed. 1987).
Vol 27
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reconcile public policy concerns with conflict of laws rules. Until the
twentieth century, English courts refused to recognize polygamous mar-
riages as a matter of implicit public policy because such marriages were
viewed as contrary to basic moral principles of Christianity. This is evident
in early polygamy cases such as Hyde v. Hyde.'0 In deciding whether to
grant a divorce," the court repeatedly referred to Christian notions of
marriage in considering the validity of a potentially polygamous' 2 Mor-
mon marriage. In refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the husband's
petition for a dissolution of the marriage, the court did not explicitly base
its decision on policy grounds.' 3 Rather, the Hyde court based its decision
on a legal technicality by reasoning that "the law of [England was] . . .
adapted to the Christian marriage, and it is wholly inapplicable to polyg-
amy."' 4 The dictum in the Hyde case, however, reveals the court's underly-
ing considerations. 15 The court, for example, remarked that marriage "as
understood in Christendom ... [is] defined as the voluntary union for life
of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others."1 6 The court's
refusal of plaintiff's petition for a divorce was a succinct expression of Eng-
land's former public policy on polygamous marriage.' 7
10. [1866] 1 LR.-P. & D. 130. This case concerned the divorce petition of an
Englishman who joined a Mormon congregation in London and later joined the cen-
tral Mormon community in Utah after being ordained a Mormon priest. Id. at 130. In
Utah, he entered into a potentially polygamous marriage. See infra note 12 and accom-
panying text. The petitioner later renounced the Mormon church, however, and
preached against it. Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R.-P. & D. at 130. After he resumed a domicile in
England, he petitioned for a divorce because his wife, who remained in Utah, had mar-
ried another Mormon. Id. at 130-31.
11. A decree of divorce is only one form of matrimonial relief in English law. Other
forms include:
[A] nullity of marriage or judicial separation; a decree of presumption of death
and dissolution of marriage; an order for financial provision on the ground of
willful neglect to maintain; an order for the alteration of a maintenance agree-
ment; ancillary relief; and an order under the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magis-
trates' Courts) Act 1960.
8 HA5BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 479 (4th ed. 1974).
12. Marriages celebrated under a system of law permitting polygamy are considered
"potentially polygamous" so long as the husband does not take another wife. DicEY &
Moms, supra note 9, at 649. An "actually polygamous" marriage is one in which the
husband has exercised his right to take additional wives. Id.
13. J.H.C. Momous, THE RECOGNrMON OF POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGEs 1N ENGLSH LAW
292 (1952). The Hyde court made no mention of public policy in its decision.
14. Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R.-P. & D. at 135.
15. The Hyde court explicitly declined to decide beyond its narrow technical hold-
ing. It held:
This court does not profess to decide upon the rights of succession or legiti-
macy which it might be proper to accord to the issue of polygamous unions, or
upon the rights or obligations in relation to third persons which people living
under the sanction of such unions may have created for themselves. All that is
intended to be here decided is that as between each other they are not entitled
to the remedies, the adjudication, or the relief of the matrimonial law of
England.
Id. at 138.
16. Id. at 133.
17. Generally, English courts in this period used a conflict of laws approach when
ascertaining the validity of foreign monogamous marriages. See Momuus, supra note 13,
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This hostile judicial attitude towards polygamy revealed itself again in
In re Bethell' s That case involved a devise of land in England by an
Englishman to his son, Christopher Bethell, for life, and then in trust for
the benefit of Christopher's child or children.19 Christopher was sent to
the Cape of Good Hope (now South Africa) and never returned to Eng-
land, although he officially remained domiciled in England. 20 While a
resident of Bechuanaland, not then an English dominion, Christopher
married a woman named Teepoo according to the customs of the
Baralong tribe, which permitted polygamy.2 ' He had a posthumous child
by her ten days after his death.22 Citing Hyde dictum, the Bethell court held
that Christopher's potentially polygamous marriage was a marriage in the
Baralong sense only and not in the English sense, and therefore the child
was illegitimate and could not succeed under the testator's will. 23
Scholars point out two possible grounds for the Bethell decision. 24
The first is that polygamous marriages were wholly unrecognized by Eng-
lish law for all purposes. This view, however, is strange since the Bethell
court incorrectly considered itself bound by Hyde.25
The second possible ground for Bethel, espoused by critics striving to
establish a narrower ground for that decision, 26 is that Christopher was
domiciled in England when he married Teepoo and thus lacked the
capacity under his "personal law" to enter a polygamous marriage. 27 This
explanation is also problematic, however, since the Bethell court never
mentioned Christopher Bethell's place of domicile. Nevertheless, it is
consistent with what has become the modem conflict of laws approach. 28
As exemplified by this second explanation, legal scholars impute a conflict
of laws analysis in the Bethell decision when in fact there was none. Indeed,
this effort by legal scholars to explain the Bethell opinion typifies early calls
for a shift to a conflict of laws approach in dealing with polygamy. Under
the common law approach seen in Hyde, however, conflict of laws rules
yielded to public policy on matters of polygamy. Consequently, marital
rights were not extended to parties in such marriages.
This legal stance eventually changed, as illustrated in The Sinha Peerage
at 288. See also Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R.-P. & D. at 133 ("Before the petitioner could obtain
the relief he seeks ... [t]he marriage, as it is called, would have to be established as
binding by the lex loci .... ").
18. [1887] 38 Ch. D. 220.
19. The will further provided for a gift over to the testator's eldest son if Christo-
pher left no child or children surviving him. Id. at 220-21.
20. Apparently the chief clerk certified that Christopher never lost his English dom-
icile of origin. Id. at 221.
21. Christopher refused to marry Teepoo in an English church on the ground that
he was a Baralong. Id. at 222.
22. Id. at 221.
23. Id. at 236-37.
24. MoRms, supra note 13, at 294.
25. Id. As noted, the Hyde court's ruling was quite narrow. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
26. Momus, supra note 13, at 294.
27. Id. For a fuller discussion of the concept of personal law, see infra note 39.
28. Mopaus, supra note 13, at 295. The modem view is discussed infra part I.A.2.
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Claim2 9 In 1919, Lord Sinha conferred a barony on his son, Sir Satyandra
Sinha, and his lawful male heirs. Although Lord Sinha had entered into a
potentially polygamous Hindu marriage in India, the couple converted to
another Eastern religion that forbade polygamy in 1886.30 After the death
of Lord Sinha in 1928, Satyandra Sinha, born in 1887, claimed the right to
succeed the peerage, and the House of Lords allowed the succession. 3 1
Notwithstanding the vagueness of the opinion,32 Sinha marked a judicial
shift towards greater legal recognition of polygamy so long as such mar-
riages were valid under the conflict of laws rules relating to marriages
generally.33
Over the course of this century, English matrimonial law further
adapted to changes within English society. England experienced an enor-
mous influx of immigrants from some of its former colonies3 4 where
polygamy was common and legal. By the 1950s, the common law, strain-
ing to further mitigate the severity of the Hyde rule,3 5 had developed a
more favorable stance towards polygamy.3 6 This was accomplished by
shifting to a conflict of laws approach in addressing the legal problem of
foreign polygamy.3 7 By this period, polygamous marriages were generally
29. [1946] 1 All E.R. 348 n.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 348-49.
32. As one commentator points out, there are at least three grounds for the the
Sinha opinion. The first is that the marriage was in fact monogamous since neither
party took on another spouse. However, this ground is contrary to Hyde and In re Bethell
since neither of these cases distinguished between potentially polygamous and actually
polygamous marriages. The second theory is that the potentially polygamous marriage
was converted into a monogamous marriage when Lord Sinha and his wife changed
religion before the petitioner was born. This explanation also is contrary to Hyde in
that the husband had changed his religion and domicile before petitioning for divorce.
The third view is that there were no grounds for refusing recognition of the validity of a
lawful polygamous marriage since the petitioner in Sinha was neither seeking to invoke
English matrimonial law nor claiming to inherit English real estate. See Mo~ms, supra
note 13, at 295-97.
33. Id. at 298.
34. DICEY & Moimus, supra note 9, at 678. See also LAw COMMISSION, FAMILY LAW:
REPORT ON POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES (LAw CoM. No. 42) 23 (1971) [hereinafter LAw
COMM'N No. 42].
35. The continued application of the harsh position taken by the Hyde court would
also have created a large number of "bastards" among Queen Victoria's subjects. CoL-
uLat, supra note 9, at 276.
36. According to a leading authority on the subject, the common law rule on the
legal recognition of polygamy was that a marriage that was polygamous, as determined
by the law of the place of celebration, and (1) that was not celebrated in England in
accordance with polygamous forms and was without any civil ceremony as required by
English law, and (2) whose parties' personal law permitted them to contract to such a
marriage, would be recognized in England as a valid marriage unless there was some
strong reason to the contrary. Dzcrs's CONFLICr OF LAws 278 (J.H.C. Morris et al. eds.,
7th ed. 1958) [hereinafter DicEv's] (citing The Sinha Peerage Claim, [1946] 1 All E.R.
348 n.; Srini Vasan v. Srini Vasan, [1946] P. 67; Baindail v. Baindail, [1946] P. 122 (Eng.
C.A.); Bamgbose v. Daniel, [1955] App. Cas. 107 (P.C.)). After the Sinha decision, it was
"clear that [polygamous marriages were] ... recognised for many purposes." Id. at 279.
The above stated rule clearly exhibits conflict of laws principles. See discussion infra
notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 36.
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given proper legal effect, but matrimonial relief was still unavailable.3 8 A
polygamous marriage was valid in England if both parties had the capacity
to contract to it by their respective personal law3 9 at the date of the matri-
monial ceremony and if the marriage was valid by the lex loci celebrationis
(the law of the place of celebration).40 Polygamous marriages celebrated
in England, however, remained invalid regardless of the domicile of the
parties.4 1
A valid polygamous marriage produced the normal rights and obliga-
tions of marriage for the purposes of invalidating a subsequent monoga-
mous marriage, legitimizing children for the law of succession and
nationality, legitimizing widows as surviving spouses for the law of succes-
sion, and maintaining actions on behalf of widows or children. 42
Although English polygamy law had progressed significantly by mid-cen-
tury, marital relief, a major component of matrimonial law, was still
unavailable to parties in a polygamous marriage.
Consistent with the post-World War II "explosion of law making in
family matters,"43 English matrimonial law continued to develop in the
early 1970s, when Parliament codified the common law on polygamy and
finally extended marital relief to immigrant polygamous marriages. Fol-
lowing the recommendations of the Law Commission, 44 Parliament insti-
tuted sweeping statutory changes with the enactment of the Matrimonial
Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972. Section 1 of that Act-
now embodied with minor changes in section 47 of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973-effectively abrogated the Hyde rule and granted matri-
monial relief to parties to a polygamous marriage, whether actual or
potential. 45 Section 4 of the 1972 Act-now section 11 (d) of the Matrimo-
38. See DICEY's, supra note 36, at 288 (citing Hyde v. Hyde [1866] 1 L.R.-P. & D. 130;
Risk v. Risk, [1950] P. 50; Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353; Muhammad v. Suna, [1956]
S.C. 366).
39. "Personal law" is the law governing personal status, which is determined by the
law of domicile. See 8 HALSBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND 473 (4th ed. 1974). Sometimes
the religious law of the person determines his or her personal law. Id. For instance,
numerous African and Asian countries have legal systems in which each religious or
ethnic community is governed by its own law in matters of personal status (e.g., Hindus
are governed by Hindu law and Muslims by Islamic law). DicEY & Momius, supra note 9,
at 650. Thus, an English court ascertaining the personal law of a person in a foreign
marriage must (1) determine that person's domicile, and (2) if the person is domiciled
in a country using a legal system described above, the court must then inquire into that
person's community. Id.
40. Mo.iPs, supra note 13, at 335. See also LAW COMM'N No. 42, supra note 34, 9.
41. The exception to this was a polygamous marriage celebrated in England before
the ambassador of the country of which the parties were citizens. In such cases, the
marriage was valid. MoRRss, supra note 13, at 335. The validity of marriages celebrated
in England was entirely regulated by statutory law. LAw COMM'N No. 42, supra note 34,
16.
42. MoPums, supra note 13, at 336.
43. STEPHEN PARKER, INFORMAL MARRIAGE, COHABITATION AND THE LAw 1750-1989
127 (1990).
44. See LAw COMM'N No. 42, supra note 34, 135.
45. Section 47(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides in part: "A court in
England and Wales shall not be precluded from granting matrimonial relief or making
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nial Causes Act 1973-codified the English policy, as widely interpreted at
that time, prohibiting English domiciliaries from contracting into polyga-
mous marriages.46 Since the implementation of this Act, statutes in other
areas of the law have adopted explicit polygamy provisions.
47
2. Current English Polygamy Law
English polygamy law today is largely the same as it was in the early 1970s,
except that it currently treats certain potentially polygamous marriages as
de facto monogamous marriages.48 Similar treatment of these forms of
a declaration concerning the validity of a marriage by reason only that the marriage in
question was entered into under a law which permits polygamy." 27 HALSBURY'S STAT-
uTmrs 791 (4th ed. 1992 reissue).
46. Section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Grounds on Which a Marriage
is Void) provides in part the following:
A marriage celebrated after 31st July 1971 shall be void on the following
grounds only, that is to say
(b) that at the time of the marriage either party was already lawfully married;
(c) that the parties are not respectively male and female;
(d) in the case of a polygamous marriage entered into outside England and
Wales, that either party was at the time of the marriage domiciled in Eng-
land and Wales.
For the purposes of paragraph (d) of this subsection a marriage may be polyga-
mous although at its inception neither party has any spouse additional to the
other.
27 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 747-48 (4th ed. 1992 reissue).
47. See, e.g., Council Tax Benefit (General) Regulations, 1992 (SI 1992 No. 1814),
§ 11 (calculation of income and capital of members of claimant's family and of a polyg-
amous marriage); Disability Working Allowance (General) Regulations, 1991 (SI 1991
No. 2887), § 12 (same); Housing Renovation etc. Grants (Reduction of Grant) Regula-
tions, 1990 (SI 1990 No. 1189), § 13 (calculation of weekly grants for polygamous mar-
riages); Community Charge Benefits (General) Regulations, 1989 (SI 1989 No. 1321),
§ 8 (same); Income Support (Transitional) Regulations, 1988 (SI 1988 No. 1229), § 3
(calculation of applicable income support for polygamous marriages); Housing Benefit
(General) Regulations, 1987 (SI 1987 No. 1971), § 17 (calculation of weekly grants for
polygamous marriages).
48. Before the landmark case by the Court of Appeal in Hussain v. Hussain, [1983]
Fam. 26 (C.A.), subsections 11(b) and (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, seesupra
note 46, were read literally to mean that under English law, no English domiciliaries
had the capacity to enter a polygamous marriage regardless of whether the marriage
was actually or potentially polygamous. LAw COMMISSION, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw:
PoLYGAious MARRIAGE (LAw COMM'N No. 146) 2.7-2.10 (1985) [hereinafter LAw.
COMM'N No. 146] (discussing the impact of Hussain on the interpretation of section
11). However, Hussain ruled this assumption incorrect with regard to certain poten-
tially polygamous marriages. See Hussain, [1983] Fam. at 33; see also LAw COMM'N No.
146, supra, 2.20. The case involved a Muslim man domiciled in England who married
a woman domiciled in Pakistan under Islamic law in Pakistan. Hussain, [1983] Fam. at
30. The Hussain court found that the marriage could not be polygamous because
neither party had the capacity to marry a second spouse under their personal laws. Id.
at 32-33. Islamic law permits polygyny, but not polyandry. Consequently, the wife was
forbidden by Islam, her personal law, to take additional husbands. Id. Similarly, the
husband's personal law, English law, forbade him to take additional wives. Id. The
Hussain court thus held that subsection 11(b), which prohibits bigamy, applied. Id. at
32. The court reasoned that since neither party had the capacity to take more than one
spouse, the marriage was monogamous and thus not invalid under section 11 (d). Id. at
33. The practical consequence of this case is that a potentially polygamous marriage
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marriage49 represents another effort by English law to accommodate the
needs of an increasingly diverse English society while maintaining its pub-
lic policy requirement that English domiciliaries enter only into de facto
monogamous marriages.50
Contemporary English law on actually polygamous marriages consists
largely of conflict of laws principles. English courts will not recognize an
actually polygamous marriage unless it was validly created according to
English private international law (i.e., conflict of laws rules). 51 The mar-
riage must have been contracted between parties of full capacity and in
compliance with the formal requirements of the lex loci celebrationis.52 Eng-
lish courts will recognize an actually polygamous marriage for most pur-
cannot be invalidated by that section if the husband is domiciled in England or, theo-
retically, any country with monogamous matrimonial law. DIcEy & MoRus, supra note
9, at 660. See also LAw COMM'N No. 146, supra, 2.10. Thus, this section applies only to
actually polygamous marriages in which the wife is domiciled in England and the hus-
band is domiciled in a country whose law permits polygyny. DicEy & Moius, supra note
9, at 660-61; see also LAw COMM'N No. 146, supra, 2.10. The approach by the Hussain
court is generally supported by legal scholars who argue that it is inappropriate to say
that a marriage is polygamous when it is de facto monogamous and neither party can
legally contract into additional marriages. See, e.g., DicEy & MoRRs, supra note 9, at
652. As a result of Hussain, English legal reformers are calling on Parliament to codify
the new interpretation. See L-Aw COMM'N No. 146, supra, 2.17. The Law Commission,
however, recommended that section 11 be amended to allow men and women domiciled
in England to have the capacity to enter marriages celebrated outside England in polyg-
amous form but which are not actually polygamous (i.e., potentially polygamous mar-
riages). See id.
49. According to the Law Commission, the two remaining legal differences between
a monogamous marriage and a potentially polygamous marriage are: (1) the present
rules on the capacity to marry; and (2) the right to succession as an "heir" to real
property, titles of honor, or entailed interests. LAW COMM'N No. 146, supra note 48,
3.5. See also P.M. NORTH &J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw 626 (12th ed. 1992) [hereinafter CHESHIRE & NORTH]. Legal scholars point out,
however, that the first difference will disappear if the Law Commission's reform propos-
als are adopted. Id. As to the second distinction, they point out that the difference is
more apparent than real, since the restrictions on succession appear to limit themselves
to the children of actually polygamous marriages. Id. The court in The Sinha Peerage
Claim, [1946] 1 All E. R. 348 n., explained this problem succinctly: "If there were sev-
eral wives, the son of a second or third wife might be the claimant to a dignity to the
exclusion of a later born son of the first wife. Our law as to heirship has provided no
means for settling such questions as these." Id. at 349 n. Consequently, adoption of the
Law Commission's proposals would effectively result in the equal treatment of both
monogamous and potentially polygamous marriages. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra, at 626.
50. As the Hussain court explained:
[I]t is difficult to conceive any reason why Parliament, in an increasingly plural-
istic society, should have thought it necessary to prohibit persons, whose reli-
gious or cultural traditions accept polygamy, from marrying in their own
manner abroad, simply because they are domiciled in England and Wales. On
the other hand, it is obvious that Parliament, having decided to recognise
polygamous marriages as marriages for purposes of our matrimonial legislation,
would think it right to preserve the principle of monogamy for persons domi-
ciled here.
Hussain, [1983] Fam. at 32.
51. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 621.
52. Id.
Vol 27
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poses53 if it is valid (1) with regard to form under the law where the
marriage took place (lex loci celebrationis) and (2) with regard to capacity
under each party's antenuptial domicile (lex domicilii, or the dual domicile
test),54 unless strong reasons dictate otherwise (e.g., public policy).5 5
These requirements are based substantially on section 11 of the Matrimo-
nial Causes Act 1973, which governs the capacity of English domiciliaries
to contract into polygamous marriages.5 6 A marriage fulfilling these
requirements, for example, would be one celebrated in Pakistan in accord-
ance with Muslim rites between Pakistani domiciliaries. 57 Hence, these
legal requirements are restricted to affect mainly immigrants from coun-
tries whose customs include polygamy.
The present law has tipped the balance in favor of immigrants in actu-
ally polygamous marriages. Courts have moved from defining those
exceptional instances where such marriages are recognized to defining
those few instances where they are not.58 Thus, aside from access to the
English matrimonial relief mechanism under section 47 of the Matrimo-
nial Causes Act 1973,- 9 actually polygamous marriages enjoy most other
privileges common to monogamous marriages. 60 Marriage law experts
note the following major continuing areas of difference between an actu-
ally polygamous marriage and a monogamous marriage: (1) the capacity
to marry and (2) certain rules relating to social security benefits.6 '
53. Id.; DicEy & MoRRs, supra note 9, at 649. See infra text accompanying note 61
for a discussion of when polygamous marriages will not be recognized. For a thorough
treatment of current English polygamy law, see generally LAW COMMISSION, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHOICE OF LAw RuL.s IN MARRIAGE (WORKING PAPER No. 89) 19
3.1-3.5 (1985) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER No. 89]; CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49,
at 621-26; DIcEY & MoRRIs, supra note 9, at 597-616.
54. This test is also commonly referred to as the "orthodox" theory. LAw COMM'N
No. 146, supra note 48, 11 2.2-2.3. See also 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 466 (4th
ed. 1974). A minority approach discussed in Radwan v. Radwan (No. 2), [1973] Fain.
35, dictates that the parties' capacity to marry is determined by their intended matrimo-
nial home. See id. at 45. Most English legal authorities, however, dismiss this theory as
incorrect. See 8 HALSBURY'S LAWs OF ENGLAND 1 477 (4th ed. 1974). The great majority
of cases on this subject continue to apply the dual domicile test. LAw COMM'N No. 146,
supra note 48, 11 2.2-2.3. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, [1985] T.L.R. (CA) (describ-
ing the dual domicile test as "the traditional and still prevalent view"). A third theory,
rejected by English courts in Ali v. Ali, [1968] P. 564, looks to the law of the place of
celebration. See also LAw COMM'N No. 146, supra note 48, 1 2.2.
55. 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 478 (4th ed. 1974).
56. See text accompanying supra note 46.
57. DicEy & MORIS, supra note 9, at 668.
58. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 621.
59. See 27 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 791 (4th ed. 1992 reissue).
60. The general pattern of legislative interpretation since the early 1970s has been a
progressive one so that the term "wife" is generally taken to include the wives in an
actually polygamous marriage. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 626.
61. Id.
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B. The Status of Lesbian & Gay Rights in England 62
Unlike polygamous marriages, same-sex marriages are not recognized in
England. As discussed below, both English statutory and common law
have traditionally been hostile to lesbian and gay rights and have only
rarely addressed same-sex marriages. English law has yet to treat same-sex
couples as other than legal strangers. 63
English statutes address homosexuality in limited terms and in hostile
and concessionary language. The Sexual Offences Act 1967,64 for exam-
ple, legalized consensual "homosexual acts" in private,6 5 but it also
imposed restrictions and penalties not otherwise imposed on different-sex
acts.66 In practice, -the definition of privacy under the act is rigidly narrow
since sexual activity between consenting same-sex adults in a bedroom vio-
lates the act if more than two people are present in the entire house. 67
Thus, even same-sex intimacy in a hotel room is technically illegal in
England. 68
Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, which prohibits local
authorities from supporting lesbian and gay rights, better illustrates statu-
tory hostility towards lesbians and gays.6 9 In particular, this statute prohib-
62. For a comprehensive summary of English lesbian and gay rights, see generally
PETER TATCHELL, EUROPE IN THE PINK: LEsBiAN & GAY EQUALrrY IN THE NEW EUROPE 84-
100 (1992) [hereinafter EUROPE IN THE PINK].
63. PARKER, supra note 43, at 6.
64. 12 HALSBURy'S STATUTES 351-57 (4th ed. 1989 reissue).
65. The Sexual Offenses Act applied only to homosexual acts between males since
lesbian sex was never criminalized. Dissenting Adults, ECONoMIsr, Nov. 8, 1980, at 60.
The reason for this is that when anti-homosexual legislation was introduced in the 19th
century, Queen Victoria refused to believe that lesbian acts were physically possible and,
as observers point out, nobody cared to explain it to her. See id.; GarethJones, Britain's
Gays Vent Outrage with a Kiss and a Hug, Reuters, Mar. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws file.
66. Until Parliament's recent intervention on February 21, 1994, see British Politi-
cians Vote to Reduce the Age of Consent for Gays, Agence France Presse, Feb. 22, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file, subsection 1(1) of the Act, for instance,
imposed a discriminatory consent age of 21 for gays. Although the new age of consent
for gay men is 18, id., the rest of the population faces a consent age of 16. See Sexual
Offences Act 1956, §§ 14, 15, 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 254-55 (4th ed. 1989 reissue); see
also PETER TATcHELL, OUT IN EUROPE: A GUIDE TO LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN 30 EURO-
PEAN COUNTRIES 18-19 (1990) (summarizing consent ages of lesbians and gay men in
Europe). Additionally, Section 1 (5) of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 maintains a prohi-
bition on homosexuality in the armed forces while section 2 of the Act maintains a
similar prohibition on merchant ships registered in England. See Sexual Offences Act
1967, §§ 1, 2, 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 351-53 (4th ed. 1989 reissue).
67. TATCHELL, supra note 66, at 29. In particular, paragraph 2 of section 1 (amend-
ment of law relating to homosexual acts in private) provides:
(2) An act which would otherwise be treated for the purposes of this Act as
being done in private shall not be so treated if done-
(a) when more than two persons take part or are present; or
(b) in a lavatory to which the public have or are permitted to have access,
whether on payment or otherwise.
12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 351 (4th ed. 1989 reissue).
68. TATCHELL, supra note 66, at 29.
69. Paragraph 1 of section 28 (prohibition on promoting homosexuality by teach-
ing or by publishing material) provides:
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its local authorities from intentionally promoting homosexuality as a
"pretended family relationship."70 Section 28 has had a considerable
impact on English lesbians and gays; local authorities, for fear of prosecu-
tion, have denied grants to causes that might conceivably violate the dis-
criminatory provision.7 '
Further, section 11 (c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 explicitly
states that a marriage is void if the parties are not "respectively male and
female,"7 2 a view that is also shared in the common law.73 Current English
law also fails to recognize any other type of same-sex relationship as illus-
trated in Harrogate Borough Council v. Simpson.74 In that case, the Court of
Appeal dismissed an appeal by a woman, Ms. Simpson, evicted by the Har-
rogate Council from an apartment she shared with Ms. Rodrigo, her part-
ner, for two-and-a-half years until Ms. Rodrigo died in 1984.75 The
apartment was in Ms. Rodrigo's name, but Ms. Simpson argued that she
should not be evicted because she was a member of Ms. Rodrigo's "family"
under the section 30 of the Housing Act 1980.76 The Court refused her
appeal, however, because it found that the two women did not meet the
statutory "family" definition under section 50(3) of the Housing Act.7 7 In
(1) A local authority shall not-
(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the inten-
tion of promoting homosexuality;
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.
25 HALBURY'S STATUTES 882, 950 (4th ed. 1990 reissue).
70. Id.
71. TATCHELL, supra note 66, at 34. Further, the constraints imposed by section 28
tend to discourage coverage of homosexuality in sex education classes. EUROPE IN THE
PINK, supra note 62, at 98. This denies students a full comprehension of human sexual-
ity and ignores the needs of those who are struggling to understand their own homosex-
uality. Id.
72. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 11(c), 27 HAisBURY's STATuTES 748 (4th ed.
1992 reissue). Section 11 (c), however, does not mean that before July 31, 1971, parties
of the same sex could enter into matrimony. This was regulated by common law. See
infra note 73.
73. SeeTalbotv. Talbot, [1967] 111 Sol.J. 213 (pronouncing a decree nisi where the
supposed husband in the marriage was in fact a woman); Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All
E.R. 33 (holding a marriage null and void where the supposed wife was in fact a male-
to-female transsexual).
74. [1986]2FLR91.
75. Id. at 92.
76. Id. Section 30 of the Housing Act 1980 reads in part:
(1) Where a secure tenancy is a periodic tenancy and, on the death of the
tenant, there is a person qualified to succeed him, the tenancy vests by virtue of
this section in that person ....
(2) A person is qualified to succeed a tenant under a secure tenancy if he occu-
pied the dwelling-house as his only or principal home at the time of the ten-
ant's death and either-
(a) he is the tenant's spouse; or
(b) he is another member of the tenant's family and has resided with the
tenant throughout the period of 12 months ending with the tenant's death.
Simpson, 2 FLR at 92-93 (emphasis added).
77. Simpson, 2 FLR at 95. Subsection 50(3) of the Housing Act 1980 only includes
people who "live together as husband and wife" in its definition of "family." Id. at 93.
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explaining its reasoning, the Simpson court wrote:
[I] t would be surprising in the extreme to learn that public opinion was such
today that it would recognise a homosexual union as being akin to a state of
living as husband and wife. The ordinary man and woman, neither in 1975
nor in 1984, would in my opinion not think even remotely of there being a
true resemblance between those two very different states of affairs.
78
The Simpson court's opinion epitomizes English judicial views on same-sex
relationships.
II. The Danish Registered Partnership Act and Its Significance
A. The Danish Registered Partnership Act
An understanding of the specific rights flowing from a registered partner-
ship is important in understanding the precise legal rights of a married
Danish same-sex couple in Denmark. It also provides a benchmark for
how the law of another country should recognize the couple.
The legislation itself is short;79 it essentially incorporated the existing
78. Simpson, [1986] 2 FLR at 95 (emphasis added).
79. The Partnership Act, reads as follows:
THE DANISH REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP ACT
WE MARGRETHE THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Denmark, do make
known that:
The Danish Folketing has passed the following Act which has received the Royal Assent:
1. Two persons of the same sex may have their partnership registered.
Registration
2. (1) Part I, sections 12 and 13(1) and clause 1 of section 13(2) of the Danish Mar-
riage (Formation and Dissolution) Act shall apply similarly to the registration of
partnership[s], cf. subsection 2 of this section.
(2) A partnership may only be registered provided both or one of the parties has his
permanent residence in Denmark and is of Danish nationality.
(3) The rules governing the procedure of registration of a partnership, including
the examination of the conditions for registration, shall be laid down by the Minister
of Justice.
Legal Effects
3. (1) Subject to the exceptions of section 4, the registration of a partnership shall
have the same legal effects as the contracting of marriage.
(2) The Provisions of Danish law pertaining to marriage and spouses shall apply
similarly to registered partnership[s] and registered partners.
4. (1) The provisions of the Danish Adoption Act regarding spouses shall not apply to
registered partners.
(2) Clause 3 of section 13 and section 15(3) of the Danish Legal Incapacity and
Guardianship Act regarding spouses shall not apply to registered partners.
(3) Provisions of Danish law containing special rules pertaining to one of the parties
to a marriage determined by the sex of that person shall not apply to registered
partners.
(4) Provisions of international treaties shall not apply to registered partnership[s]
unless the other contracting parties agree to such application.
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marriage law by reference and extends it to same-sex couples,8 0 with a few
exceptions. Under section 3 of the Partnership Act, all the legal conse-
quences of a different-sex marriage apply equally to a registered partner-
ship, subject to the exceptions listed in section 4 of the Act.81
Accordingly, Danish rules governing property in marriage and the right of
married persons to social welfare payments apply to registered partner-
ships as well. 82 Further, on the death of one of the partners, the regis-
tered partnership dissolves, and the surviving partner may keep undivided
possession of the estate in accordance with Danish inheritance laws, 83 sub-
ject to the exception regarding common heirs.84 Finally, obligations
under family law, such as mutual maintenance duties, taxation, and possi-
ble alimony payments upon divorce, also apply to registered partner-
ships.8 5 To accommodate the various changes created by the Partnership
Act, the Folketing86 simultaneously passed a companion bill amending the
Danish Marriage Act, the Inheritance Act, the Inheritance and Gifts (Tax-
Dissolution
5. (1) Parts 3, 4, and 5 of the Danish Marriage (Formation and Dissolution) Act and
Part 42 of the Danish Administration ofJustice Act shall apply similarly to the disso-
lution of a registered partnership, cf. subsections 2 and 3 of this section.
(2) Section 46 of the Danish Marriage (Formation and Dissolution) Act shall not
apply to the dissolution of a registered partnership.
(3) Irrespective of section 448 c of the Danish Administration of Justice Act[,) a
registered partnership may always be dissolved in this country.
Commencement etc.
6. This Act shall come into force on October 1, 1989.
7. This Act shall not apply to the Faroe Islands nor to Greenland but may be made
applicable by Royal Order to these parts of the country with such modifications as
are required by the special Faroese and Greenlandic conditions.
Given at Christiansborg Castle, this Seventh Day ofJune, 1989 [.J
Under Our Royal Hand and Seal
MARGRETHE R[.]
(Translation performed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Den-
mark) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
80. Partnership Act, supra note 2, § 3. See text supra note 79. Interestingly, the
unions under the act are labeled "partnerships" rather than marriages. The act itself,
however, compares its effects to those of marriage numerous times. See id. §§ 2(1),
3(1), 3(2), 5(1). For a comparison of registered partnerships to marriages, see gener-
ally Michael Elmer & Marianne L. Larsen, Explanatory Article on the Legal Consequences,
Etc., of the Danish Law on Registered Partnership. This article is an English translation of an
article that appeared inJuristen, a Danish lawjournal. The translation is available from
Landsforeningen for Bosser og Lesbiske (National [Danish] Organization for Gays and Lesbians)
in Copenhagen. See also Marianne H. Pedersen, Denmark. Homosexual Marriages and New
Rules Regarding Separation and Divorce, 30 J. FAM. L. 289, 289-91 (1991-92).
81. Partnership Act, supra note 2, § 3. See text supra note 79.
82. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See also Pederson, supra note 80 at 290.
86. The Folketing is the Danish Parliament. See 3 MODERN LcAL SvsTMs
CYCLOPEDIA § 3.1(B) (1990).
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ation) Act, and the Penal Code.8 7
To enter a same-sex marriage, at least one of the individuals must be a
Danish citizen and a permanent resident of Denmark.8 8 Commentators
believe that the citizenship provision was added because the Folketing
believed that marriages under the Partnership Act would probably not be
recognized abroad.8 9 In addition to the citizenship requirement, the
unions must take place in civil ceremonies since the Partnership Act does
not provide for ceremonies in the Danish Protestant Church.9 0
The four exceptions imposed on same-sex marriages are embedded
in section 4 of the Partnership Act. Subsection 4(1) exempts the provi-
sions of the Danish Adoption Act from applying to registered partners.
The partners are consequently unable to adoptjointly.9 1 Subsection 4(2)
exempts the regulations of the Danish child custody law from applying to
registered partners. 92 Subsection 4(3) exempts a special provision of the
Marriage (Effects) Act-requiring a husband to be responsible for "his
wife's ordinary contracts entered into in satisfaction of her own special
needs" 9 3-from applying to registered partnerships. Lastly, subsection
4(4) exempts the Partnership Act from international treaties unless the
contracting parties agree otherwise.
The last of these exceptions, subsection 4(4), is of special importance
to this Note. It explicitly exempts registered partnerships from interna-
tional agreements. 94 This provision is based on the expectation that for
the moment registered partnerships will only have legal effect in Den-
87. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 80. The Marriage Act, for example, was amended to
provide that an undissolved registered partnership is an impediment to marriage in the
same way as is a previous marriage. Id. at 4. Similarly, the Penal Code was amended to
make bigamy in relation to a registered partnership punishable. Id.
88. Partnership Act, supra note 2, § 2(2). See text supra note 79.
89. Pedersen, supra note 80, at 290. The reasoning behind this notion may be that
the Partnership Act is, as Denmark's Christian People's Party argued, at odds with the
laws of other countries. See Rule, supra note 1.
90. Julian Isherwood, 11 Homosexual Couples Wed Under New Danish Law, UPI, Oct. 1,
1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; Pederson, supra note 80, at 290.
One high church official, however, has expressed explicit support for the celebration of
same-sex marriages in the Danish Protestant Church. In a comment expressing his
hope that same-sex marriages would soon be celebrated in Denmark's Protestant
Church, the senior bishop, Ole Bertelsen of Copenhagen, remarked that he hopes
"that time is not far off." Isherwood, supra.
91. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 80; Pederson, supra note 80, at 290. This provision
is based on the assumption that registered partners can have children separately but
not together. Id. Danish legislators, however, admitted that the government's rationale
behind §4(1) is the fear that Third World countries would stop the flow of adoptive
children to Denmark. Isherwood, supra note 90.
92. This means that a registered couple cannot obtain common custody of children
from a previous marriage of either party. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 80. There is
nothing to prevent one of the partners, however, from obtaining custody of his or her
child. Id.
93. Id.
94. As of yet, no agreement exists between Denmark and another nation to recog-
nize the Partnership Act outside Danish borders. Opponents of the Partnership Act
charged that the law was impractical because it would not be recognized elsewhere. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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mark.95 This provision, however, does not prevent other governments
from recognizing the rights of Danish same-sex couples outside
Denmark.96
B. A Milestone in the Progression of Human Rights
1. Justifications for Same-Sex Marriage Laws and Their Foreign Recognition
An amalgam of practical, legal, and moral arguments dictates the necessity
for same-sex marriage laws. Few people would deny that marriage is a
heavily favored institution in most societies. The United States Supreme
Court, for example, described marriage as "one of the basic civil rights of
[men and women]," 97 and the freedom to marry as "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness."98 In cultures everywhere, marriage triggers
"a universe of rights, privileges and presumptions."9 9 In the United States,
for instance, marriage carries with it a myriad of benefits, including: (1)
numerous income tax advantages, including deductions, credits, and
exemptions; (2) access to public assistance programs; (3) control, division,
acquisition, and disposition of community property; (4) rights relating to
dower, curtesy, and inheritance; (5) award of child custody and support
payments in divorce proceedings; (6) the right to spousal support; (7) the
right to enter into premarital agreements; (8) the right to change one's
name; (9) the right to file a nonsupport action; (10) post-divorce rights
relating to support and property division; (11) the benefit of the spousal
privilege and confidential marital communications; and (12) the right to
bring a wrongful death action.' 0 0
Further, marriage promotes social stability through the protection it
affords its participants and their families. Contrary to the assertions of
same-sex marriage opponents, 101 extending marital rights to same-sex
couples would promote the family by protecting lesbian and gay fami-
lies. 10 2 Andrew Sullivan, the editor of the New Republic, argues that the
95. Elmer & Larsen, supra note 80.
96. The Partnership Act does not, of course, prohibit such foreign recognition.
97. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
98. Id.
99. Thomas Stoddard, Yes: Marriage is a Fundamental Right (Gay Marriage: Should
Homosexual Marriages be Recognized Legally?), A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 42.
100. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993).
101. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, No: Reserve Marriage for Heterosexuals (Gay Marriage: Should
Homosexual Marriages be Recognized Legally?), A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 43 (arguing that
legalizing same-sex marriage would hinder the societal goal of producing psychologi-
cally, emotionally, and educationally balanced offspring and would send the wrong
social message that different-sex marriages are not preferable).
102. Even without legal protection, however, there is a marked increase in the
number of gay families. SeeJean L. Griffin, The Gay Baby Boom: Homosexual Couples Chal-
lenge Traditions as They Create New Families, CHi. TiuB., Sep. 3, 1993, at C1. In the United
States, a "gay baby boom" is currently taking shape. Id. Increasing numbers of same-sex
couples are creating their own families, through adoption, artificial insemination, and
surrogate motherhood. Id. What amounted to a 1980s baby boom among lesbian
couples is now increasingly common among men, creating a gay baby boom. Id. One
of the reasons for the baby boom is that the gay rights movement has provided a safe
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institution of same-sex marriage advances the conservative cause by "fos-
ter[ing] social cohesion, emotional security[,] and economic prudence." 0 3
Similarly, civil rights attorney Tom Stoddard justifies legalizing same-sex
marriage on three primary grounds. 10 4 First, marriage provides practical
economic and legal benefits.' 0 5 Second, marriage provides validity for les-
bian and gay relationships. 10 6 Third, legalizing same-sex marriages may
divest marriage of its sexist base.' 0 7
Legally-endorsed discrimination exists when some members of society
are allowed to marry and enjoy its accompanying benefits while others are
denied this privilege solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. Conse-
quently, the law commits an injustice and a moral violation by stigmatizing
lesbian and gay members as second-class citizens of society.
2. Same-Sex Marriage: An Emerging Civil Right'0 8
Western society generally considers the freedom to marry a fundamental
civil right and has protected this freedom through its laws. The U.S.
Supreme Court has characterized the freedom to marry as essential to the
pursuit of happiness' 0 9 and as "one of the 'basic civil rights of man."'1 10
The right to marry is also protected on an international level by human
rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights11 and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
environment in which gay men and lesbians can develop open, stable, long-term rela-
tionships. Id. Unfortunately, lawyers working in this area point out that the law has not
caught up with society and technology. Id.
103. James P. Pinkerton, A Conservative Argument for Gay Marriage; Forming Families
Leads to Social Stability. Why Fight it?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at B7 (quoting Andrew
Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug.
28, 1989, at 20, 22).
104. Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Many, in LESBtANs, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAw 398, 398-401 (William B. Rubinstein ed., 1993).
105. Id. at 399.
106. Id. at 400.
107. Id. at 401.
108. Although marriage is often categorized as a civil right, see, e.g., International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23, 6 I.L.M. 368, 375 (1967) (protecting the
right to marry) [hereinafter Covenant]; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)(describing marriage as a basic civil right), it is also sometimes categorized as a "human
right." See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 232 (1955) [hereinafter Convention]
(protecting the right to marry).
109. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
110. Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
111. Covenant, supra note 108. Article 23 of this treaty provides in part:
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and the
State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a
family shall be recognized.
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Fundamental Freedoms 1 2 (Convention). In Europe, the right to marry is
guaranteed by the constitutions of several nations,113 and most European
countries, including Denmark and England, belong to the Convention. 114
Despite this protection, marital laws have in the past helped keep
minorities in inferior social strata. In the United States, for example, mar-
riage among slaves was prohibited until the Civil War.115 In addition,
many states enforced antimiscegenation statutes1 16 until the Supreme
Court declared them unconstitutional in 1967.117
Restrictions on the gender composition of a married couple 118 are
substantively identical to former restrictions on the racial composition of a
married couple. 1 19 The arguments supporting the prohibition of same-
sex marriages parallel the arguments used to prohibit interracial mar-
riages. In justifying their antimiscegenation statutes, Virginia and other
6 I.L.M. at 375.
112. Convention, supra note 108. Article 12 of the Convention provides: "Men and
women of marriageable age have the right to marry and found a family, according to
the national laws governing the exercise of this right." Id. art. 12.
The Convention constitutes a floor of protection since the Contracting States may
not proscribe the basic rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Lawrence R.
Heifer, Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United Europe, 32 VA. J.
Itr'L L. 157, 160 (1991). Contracting states, however, are free to maintain their own
higher standards of protection. Article 60 of the Convention specifically provides:
"Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of
the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of
any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party." Con-
vention, supra note 108, art. 60.
113. Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States, in HoMosExuALnr. A
EUROPEAN COMMuNrrY ISSUE 71, 91 (Kees Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham eds., 1993) (cit-
ing, for example, Art. 6 of the German Constitution and Art. 32 of the Spanish
Constitution).
114. The Contracting States are those nations that have ratified the Convention.
These nations include Austria, Belgium, Cypress, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia signed the Convention in 1990 and
1991 respectively, although neither had ratified it as of March 1, 1991. Council of
Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, No. 5 (Mar. 1991).
115. Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, H1V-ADS and the Non-Traditional Family: The
Argument for State and Federal Recognition of Danish Same-Sex Marriages, 16 NovA L. REv.
809, 810 (1992).
116. These statutes constituted one dividing practice used by the state to isolate and
marginalize African-American citizens. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex
Marriage, 79 VA. L. Rxv. 1419, 1507 (1993). •
117. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
118. I.e., male-male, male-female, or female-female.
119. For a legal discussion on the similarities between antimiscegenation statutes and
those forbidding same-sex marriages, see Baehr v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 44, 59-63, 67-68
(Haw. 1993) (concluding that prohibitions on same-sex marriages are no different than
those on interracial marriages); Eskridge, supra note 116, at 1507 (same). See also Mark
Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution; On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 StrF-
rout U. L. REv. 981 (1991) (analogizing the legal prohibition of interracial marriages to
that of same-sex marriages); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding. Same-Sex Marriage
and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93 (1993) (same).
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states asserted the same definitional (marriage has never included differ-
ent-race couples), morality-based (God ordained this), and pragmatic
(people would be upset if interracial couples were allowed to marry) argu-
ments that states now invoke to justify prohibiting same-sex marriages. 120
Unlike the dismantled antimiscegenation statutes, however, prohibitions
on same-sex marriages exist in most of the modern world, with the excep-
tion of Denmark and Norway. For this reason, Denmark's Partnership Act
represents a hallmark in the evolution of civil rights.1 2 1
The Partnership Act is not the product of ephemeral politics in Den-
mark; rather, the Act resulted from over forty years of campaigning by
advocates. 122 The Act also seems to foreshadow similar changes in the
laws of Denmark's European neighbors. 123 The Norwegian government,
120. Eskridge, supra note 116, at 1507. See also Baehr v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 44, 59-63, 67-
68 (Haw. 1993) (acknowledging the similarities of the arguments used in justifying the
former prohibition on interracial marriages and the current prohibition on same-sex
marriages). In particular, the Baehr court wrote:
Analogously to Lewin's argument[,] ... the Virginia courts declared that inter-
racial marriage simply could not exist because the Deity had deemed such a
union intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had theretofore never
been the "custom" of the state to recognize mixed marriages, marriage "always"
having been construed to presuppose a different configuration. With all due
respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone era, we do not believe that trial judges
are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply
demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs
change with an evolving social order.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 (Levinson, J., plurality) (citations omitted).
121. A study conducted by the European Value Systems Study Group in 1992 ranked
Denmark as the least bigoted country in Europe, followed by France, Sweden, and Nor-
way. SeeJames Hardy, Britain Fifth in European "Bigotry League," Press Association Lim-
ited, July 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The study tested 14
European countries regarding the levels of prejudice against groups seen as "different"
from accepted society. Id. Denmark also ranked second, trailing only Sweden, in a list
of the world's freest countries as ranked by the United Nations Development Program
in its 1991 human "freedom index." Edward Epstein, World Insider. Home of the Free
Trails 12 Others, S.F. CHRON.,July 2, 1991, at A9; Andrew Borowiec, Land of the Semi-Free?,
WASH. TiMEs, May 23, 1991, at Al. The United States was tied with Australia for 13th.
Id. The index consists of a set of 40 criteria by which it measures the level of freedom
enjoyed by the citizens of the various nations of the world. Id. It covers such things as
freedom of religion, freedom from child labor, freedom to travel abroad, freedom of
the press, the right to assemble, trade union rights, lesbian and gay rights, sexual equal-
ity, and the absence of the death penalty. Id.
122. Rule, supra note 1. The Folketing passed the Partnership Act by an overwhelm-
ing vote of 71 to 47. Id.
123. In addition to Norway, see infra note 124 and accompanying text, the Nether-
lands and Sweden have in the last few years extended benefits to lesbian and gay
couples similar to those given to unmarried different-sex couples. TATcHELL, supra
note 66, at 22, 26. Commentators also expect these countries to adopt same-sex mar-
riage statutes in the near future. See, e.g., Heifer, supra note 112, at 181. In the Nether-
lands in 1990, for example, two gay men appealed the refusal of the registry office to
marry them. Dutch Supreme Court Justice Schroeder recommended that the Dutch
parliament enact new laws extending legal recognition and rights to same-sex couples.
Netherlands Considers Giving Legal Rights to Homosexual Couples, Reuters, Nov. 1, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; TATCHELL, supra note 66, at 22. All of the
Netherlands' main political parties have accepted this proposal. Id. Despite the lack of
legal recognition of same-sex marriages, however, Dutch same-sex couples may enter
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for example, recently enacted a same-sex marriage law, effective August 1,
1993, that is very similar to Denmark's.' 2 4 Further, although no state in
the United States currently recognizes same-sex marriages, 125 many cities
are moving to minimize the adverse effects of marital legal discrimina-
tion1 26 by creating domestic partnership laws in their jurisdictions and
extending various benefits127 to partners of lesbian and gay city employ-
ees.128 The response by Denmark and Norway, as well as the legal dia-
legal contracts, arranging a set of private rights that are similar to those given to oppo-
site-sex marriages. Id.
Significant progress on lesbian and gay rights is not limited to the above-mentioned
countries. The European Court of Human Rights has protected the right of all Europe-
ans to adult homosexual privacy through two major decisions: Dudgeion v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1981), and Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser.A) (1988). In addition, numerous other European countries have enacted lesbian
and gay rights laws incorporating varying degrees of protection. See generally TATCHELL,
supra note 66; EUROPE IN THE PINK, supra note 62; Waaldijk, supra note 113.
124. See Fiona Smith, Norway Legalises Gay Marriages, IR. TimEs, Aug. 4, 1993, at 7; see
also Norwegian Gays Many After Change in Law, Reuters, Aug. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws file [hereinafter Norwegian Gays]. The law provides same-sex
couples the same legal rights as opposite-sex couples, except: (1) the right to church
marriages, and (2) the right to adopt. Smith, supra. Vidar Kildahl, spokesman for the
Norwegian Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, explained, "[tihe judicial and eco-
nomic regulations are otherwise identical with matrimony. Only Denmark has a similar
law." Norwegian Gays, supra.
125. The state of Hawaii, however, recently laid the groundwork for what may result
in the first legal recognition of same-sex marriages in the United States. In Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), three same-sex couples challenged Hawaii's marriage
law, which banned same-sex marriages. They argued, among other things, that it dis-
criminated on the basis of sex (e.g., a woman can marry a man but not a woman). Id. at
49-50. One of the state's main arguments was that the same-sex marriage prohibition
was justified on notions of tradition. See id. at 52. The Hawaii Supreme Court, in a
narrow plurality opinion, ruled that the law was presumptively unconstitutional under
the state constitution's equal protection clause. Id. at 68. The Baehr court rejected the
state's argument, finding that reliance on tradition is grounded in relative notions of
religion and status quo but it is not a legal argument. Id. at 63. The Baehr court
remanded the case, directing the lower court to subject the marriage statute to the strict
scrutiny test. The court required the state to demonstrate that "(a) the statute's sex-
based classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is nar-
rowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional
rights." Id. at 67, 68.
126. Since the law has not "kept up with the changes in family life[,] ... many groups
which function as families are not recognized as such, and are denied benefits which
society bestows upon families which resemble the traditional model . . . ." Mary P.
Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of"Family," 26 GONZ. L. REv. 91, 92 (1990).
127. Some of the typical benefits extended to domestic partners include health bene-
fits, sick leave, and bereavement leave. See id. at 101-02 n.32.
128. See generally id.; Adrienne K. Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MrrCH-
ELL L. REv. 539 (1991). For further discussions of legal discrimination against same-sex
couples in U.S. matrimonial law, see generally Kristin Bullock, Applying Marvin v. Mar-
vin to Same-Sex Couples: A Proposal for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract Statute;
25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1029 (1992); Closen & Heise, supra note 115; Ruth Colker, Mar-
riage (Lesbian and Gay), 3 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 321 (1991); DwightJ. Penas, Bless the Tie
that Binds: A Puritan-Covenant Case for Same-Sex Mar-iage 8 LAw & INEQ. J. 533 (1990);
Hannah Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and
Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WoMEN'S L.J. 94 (1988); Edward A. Slavin et al., What Makes a
Mariage Legal? Here is the Case for Legitimizing Gay Relationships, 18 HUM. RTs. 16 (1991);
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logue in other countries, thus illustrates that discriminatory prohibitions
of same-sex marriages is an emerging civil rights issue.
M. England in Focus: Rationale for Analogizing Recognition of
Foreign Same-Sex Marriages to Recognition of Foreign
Polygamous Marriages
England has gone further than most countries in shedding the absolute
supremacy of the concept of monogamous traditional marriages. This is
illustrated by England's well-developed case law regarding the legal recog-
nition of polygamy. 12 9 England, however, also has a strong social and
legal hostility to even basic gay and lesbian issues and is therefore a needy
candidate for positive legal improvement.' 30 Additionally, as a member of
the EC, England is affected by the social policy acts of other Member
States since relocation within the EC is relatively easy.' 3 '
The current state of English polygamy law exhibits a shift towards a
conflict of laws approach and a retreat from the obsolescent public policy
of strict conformance to conventional notions of marriage. The present
rules represent a desire by English law to accommodate immigrants who
entered into polygamous marriages abroad.' 3 2 The evolution of polygamy
law in England thus serves as an ideal analogy for the argument that Dan-
ish same-sex marriages should be recognized by English courts under the
same terms as are polygamous marriages.
Same-sex marriages are-as were polygamous marriages in early
polygamy cases' 3 3 -considered contrary to conventional Christian matri-
monial principles.' 34 English courts moved toward acceptance of foreign
polygamous marriages by shedding the unyielding public policy of adher-
Strasser, supra note 120; Lisa PR Zimmer, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12
CRtozo L. Rxv. 681 (1990).
129. See supra part I.A.
130. See generally STEPHEN JEFFERY-PouLTER, PEERS, QUEERS, AND THE COMMONS
(1991); see also TATCHELL, supra note 66, at 29-34.
131. SeeEEC TrATY, supra note 5, arts. 48, 49, 100, 101, 117. In particular, Article 48
gives EC workers the right to enter another EC Member State and search for or take up
work there. For a discussion on lesbian and gay concerns with regard to the EEC
Treaty's freedom of movement for workers, see Andrew Clapham &J.H.H. Weiler, Les-
bians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order, in HoMosExu~Arrr. A EuRo.
PEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE 7, 39-40 (Kees Waaldjk & Andrew Clapham eds., 1993). See also
Hans U.J. d'Oliveira, Lesbians and Gays and the Freedom of Movement of Persons, in HOMO-
sExuArr. A EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY ISSUE 289 (Kees Waaldjk & Andrew Clapham eds.,
1993).
132. See discussion supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
133. See discussion supra part I.A.1.
134. Compare, however, the polygamous beliefs of the Church ofJesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints (Mormon Church) and the same-sex marriages throughout Christian his-
tory. Joseph Smith, Jr., founder of the Mormon Church, described polygamy as "the
most holy and important doctrine ever revealed to man on earth." RIcHARD S. VAN
WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY. A HISTORY iii (1986). Smith insisted that without the
practice of polygamy, "fullness of exaltation" in the hereafter was unattainable. Id. The
Mormon Church publicly advocated polygamy until 1890 when it eliminated the prac-
tice under pressure from the U.S. Congress. Id. See also JEssE L. EMBRY, MORMON
POLYGAMOUS FAMIUIEs: LIFE IN THE PRINCIPLE 3-16 (1987). For a comprehensive discus-
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ence to strict Christian matrimonial principles of monogamy, focusing
instead on conflict of laws principles.' 35 This change in policy was necessi-
tated by the enormous hardships that the previous policy placed on a sig-
nificant sector of English immigrant society.' 36 Although English courts
have yet to address this issue, a married same-sex couple from Denmark
who moved to England today would probably face the same obstacles and
judicial hostility toward the recognition of their marriage as immigrant
polygamous marriages did in the early polygamy cases.' 3 7 The yielding to
conflict of laws principles-in an effort to achieve just results with regard
to polygamous marriages-illustrates the willingness of English courts to
move away from exclusive Christian marital principles. Any theoretical
argument against a similar legal recognition of other non-traditional mar-
riages from other countries has consequently been forfeited. Not only
would a negative legal stance on this issue by English courts undermine
the legal, intellectual, and moral integrity of the law, but it would also
undermine the law's intended goal of achieving just results.
IV. Analysis of Danish Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in England
A. Preliminary Considerations
Under typical conflict of laws rules, the courts of a given country must take
into consideration another country's rule of law.' 38 These rules work best
where the nations involved share common traditions.' 3 9 Problems can
arise, however, when the legal philosophies of the countries in question
differ despite their common cultural traditions.' 40 This is most apparent
in marriage law where courts often must reconcile two views of an institu-
sion of polygamy in Christianity, see generallyJoHn CAURNcioss, ArER POLYGAMY WAS
MADE A SIN: THE SociAL HISTORY OF CHmsmTAN POLYGAMY (1974).
Same-sex marriage ceremonies were performed in Christian Europe from the fifth
century to as late as the 1940s. These ceremonies were performed by priests in
churches from Constantinople to Rome and were considered to be a common custom.
John E. Boswell, Jews, Bicycle Riders, and Gay People: The Determination of Social Consensus
and Its Impact on Minorities, 1 YAIEJ.L. & HuMAN. 205, 212 (1989). Professor Boswell
notes that Montaigne was aware of same-sex marriages in Rome, English anthropolo-
gists such as M.E. Durham studied them, and novelists such as Christopher Isherwood
mentioned them in this century. Id. at n.18. For a comprehensive historical account of
same-sex marriage from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia to the modem West, see
Eskridge, supra note 116, at 1435-84.
Finally, it is perhaps ironic that one of the first couples married under the Danish
Partnership Act was Reverend Ivan Larsen, a cleric at the Evangelical-Lutheran parish
in Copenhagen, and Ove Carlsen, a school psychologist. Rule, supra note 1. When
Reverend Larsen told his I1,000-member congregation that he would be joining in a
homosexual partnership with Mr. Carlsen, the parishioners wished the couple good
luck. Id.
135. Alternatively, one could argue that the public policy itself became more
favorable to polygamous marriages.
136. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
137. E.g., Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R.-P. & D. 130. See supra notes 10-17 and accom-
panying text.
138. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 3.
139. MoRms, supra note 13, at 287.
140. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 27
tion that intimately affects human beings. 141 Although no case on point
has yet been reported, an English court deciding whether to legally recog-
nize a Danish same-sex marriage would face difficult issues.
The immigration problems found in many polygamy cases 142 are
irrelevant to Danish same-sex marriages in England. Since both Denmark
and Great Britain are members of the EC, workers from both countries
can freely relocate within the EC143 without facing the immigration rules
applicable to non-EC citizens. 144 The analysis in part IV.B. of this Note
thus focuses on the model of a same-sex married couple in which both
parties are citizens and domiciliaries of Denmark but subsequently resettle
in England for work-related reasons.
B. A Hypothetical Case
The circumstances under which a court would need to determine the
validity of a Danish marriage are too numerous for the scope of this
Note.145 Consequently, this Note focuses on only one such situation:
intestate succession by a spouse.1 46
In this hypothetical case, a same-sex married couple, Spouse 1 (SP1)
and Spouse 2 (SP2), were married in Denmark under the Registered Part-
nership Act. Both parties were Danish citizens and domiciliaries, but they
subsequently resettled in England for business reasons. Upon relocation,
SPI acquired a modest amount of real property in England for investment
purposes. After a few years of residing together in England, SPI died
intestate and without any other living family members. An English court
must decide whether to honor SP2's claim to SPI's estate, thus recogniz-
ing the same-sex marriage for succession purposes. If it decides that there
are no ascertainable legal heirs, the estate belongs to the Crown.147 If,
however, the English court recognizes the Danish marriage, SP2 then has
141. See id.
142. This occurs, for instance, because parties to a polygamous marriage who try to
enter England usually come from parts of the world where polygamy is common. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
143. See discussion supra note 132. The other current members of the EC are
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, and Spain. GEORGE A. BERmANN Er AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 6-15 (1993).
144. See discussion supra note 3. Norway is not yet a member of the EC. See supra
note 143.
145. As with different-sex marriages, such circumstances may involve questions rang-
ing from marital tax issues to divorce. See supra text accompanying note 100.
146. Conceivably, an English court may simply dispense with the case by ruling that
couples in SPI and SP2's situation could have willed their property to each other. Such
an action by the court, however, avoids the central legal issue.
147. In particular, ifSPI leaves no.ascertainable legal heirs, his estate belongs to the
Crown, the Duchy of Lancaster, or the Duke of Cornwall, as the case may be, as bona
vacantia and in lieu of any right to escheat. E.H. BumN, CHESHIRE & BURN'S MODERN
LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 816 (13th ed. 1982). "Bona vacantia" refers to property, real or
personal, which passes to the state as an incident of sovereignty when no owner, heir, or
next of kin claims it. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 177-78 (6th ed. 1990).
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the same legal succession rights under English law as any other spouse.'
48
A court deciding this claim faces two important considerations. The
court may look to general conflict of laws rules, as English courts have
done in examining polygamous marriages, and legally recognize the Dan-
ish marriage. Under this result, SP2 would rightfully inherit SPI's estate.
Considering the controversial nature of the case, however, the court may
resort to the public policy doctrine to trump the general conflict of laws
rules and thus dismiss SP2's claim.
1. General Conflict of Laws Analysis
The court could follow the normal conflict of laws rules and reasoning, as
with polygamy, in order to legally recognize the Danish same-sex marriage.
The application of general conflict of laws rules is both difficult, because it
represents a break with obsolescent public policy, and simple, because of
the straightforward analysis involved.
Since the union between the Danish same-sex couple is effectually a
marriage, 149 just as a polygamous union is a marriage, 150 normal conflict
of laws rules on marriage should apply. In the given hypothetical, (1) the
marriage took place in Denmark and is valid in form by the lex loci celebra-
tionis, and (2) both parties are Danish citizens and domiciliaries and had
the capacity to contract into the marriage. Consequently, general conflict
of laws rules dictate that the English court give full legal effect to SP1 and
SP2's marriage in adjudicating SP2's claim. This simple analysis, essen-
tially the same as that applied to polygamy, gives legal recognition to the
same-sex marriage, thus allowing SP2 to rightfully succeed SPI's estate.
It is true that under subsection 4(4) of the Partnership Act,' 5 Eng-
land, or any other country, is not legally obligated to recognize the Danish
same-sex marriage. This provision, however, does not bar England from
recognizing these marriages. In view of England's recognition of certain
polygamous marriages, England should similarly recognize same-sex mar-
riages if they otherwise meet the requirements set out in conflict of laws
rules.
Statutory English matrimonial law is governed by the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973.152 Section 14 of this Act' 53 provides that a marriage gov-
148. If the property in question is immovable and is on English soil, English courts
will apply English property law. See CHESHIRE & NoRTH, supra note 49, at 784.
149. See discussion supra note 80.
150. Recall that in In re BethelI [1887] 38 Ch. D. 220, an early polygamy case, the
court noted that a polygamous marriage was not a marriage in the "English" sense. See
id. at 236-37.
151. See Partnership Act, supra note 2. See also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
152. 27 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 751 (4th ed. 1992 reissue).
153. Id. Section 14 (Marriage Governed by Foreign Law or Celebrated Abroad
Under English Law) of the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (formerly section 4(1) of
the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971) reads in part:
Where, apart from this Act, any matter affecting the validity of a marriage
would fall to be determined (in accordance with the rules of private interna-
tional law) by reference to the law of a country outside England and Wales,
nothing in section 11, 12 or 13(1) above shall-
(a) preclude the determination of that matter as aforesaid; or
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erned by foreign law may be recognized by English courts notwithstanding
section 11 (c), which voids any marriage if the parties are not respectively
male and female.' 5 4 Section 14 thus allows English courts to determine
the validity of any marriage according to the rules of a foreign nation
when the conflict of laws rules so require. 15 5
Much of the language used in English polygamy case law is as applica-
ble to same-sex marriages as it is to polygamous marriages. For example,
English courts in the mid-1800s once described polygamous marriages as
"infidel."' 56 A vastly different stance toward such marriages, however,
appeared in Cheni v. Cheni.15 7  In that 1965 opinion, the court
acknowledged:
[T]he expression "Christendom" cannot be easily defined at the present day
when in so many countries, whose inhabitants profess the Christian faith,
legislative enactments have made marked departures from the canon law
which was universal when the Church of Rome was... practically the sole
maker of matrimonial laws. In general the phrase nowadays would seem to
embrace civilised nations, and not exclusively those which profess the doc-
trines of Christianity.' 58
In refusing to declare a foreign polygamous marriage void, the Cheni
court ruled that an "injustice would be perpetrated and conscience would
be affronted if the English court were not to recognise and give effect to
the law of the domicile in this case." 159 A similar injustice would clearly be
perpetrated if English courts refused to recognize and give legal effect to
the Danish same-sex marriage.
2. Public Policy Analysis
Recognition of the Danish same-sex marriage in England should occur if
general conflict of laws rules are applied in the same manner as applied to
foreign polygamy. An English court can, however, override this system of
rules on public policy grounds. It is unrealistic to believe that an English
court would confine its analysis to conflict of laws rules in resolving the
hypothetical case. Ultimately, the public policy question will probably be
the deciding factor, either explicitly or implicity,160 in the English court's
decision to grant or deny legal recognition to the Danish same-sex
marriage.
(b) require the application to the marriage of the grounds or bar there men-
tioned except so far as applicable in accordance with those rules.
Id.
154.- See supra note 46.
155. 27 HALSBURY'S STATUTEs 751 n. (4th ed. 1992 reissue).
156. See Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R.-P. & D. at 134. An "infidel" is a person who is
not a Christian or who opposes Christianity. MEbuuAM WEBSTER'S COLtcEIATE DiCrioN-
ARv 598 (10th ed. 1993).
157. [1965] P.85.
158. Id. at 96-97 (quoting 7 HA.SBURy'S LAwS OF ENcLAND 163 (3d ed. 1954)).
159. Id. at 99.
160. The Hyde court, for example, implicitly relied upon the public policy doctrine.
See discussion infra part I.A.1.
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Conflict of laws rules regarding foreign polygamous marriage gener-
ally apply unless there is some strong public policy to the contrary.1 61 The
public policy doctrine provides that English courts will not enforce or rec-
ognize a right, power, capacity, disability, or legal relationship arising
under foreign law if doing so would be inconsistent with fundamental
English public policy.16 2 Hence, domestic rules designed to protect the
welfare of the public must prevail over inconsistent foreign rules.
16 3
The public policy that could potentially trump SP2's right to succeed
SPI's estate is the conventional Christian notion of marriage. This notion,
as quintessentially stated in Hyde, holds that a marriage may take place
only between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.
164
This policy is also expressed in subsequent common law,165 in section 11
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,166 and in England's numerous anti-
gay laws.' 67 Looking to thesesources, an English court may decide that
the Danish marriage is contrary to English public policy and refuse to rec-
ognize it. Such a holding would clearly defeat SP2's claim.
The public policy exception, however, is used only sparingly in the
conflict of laws area;' 6 8 a broader use might frustrate the whole basis of
the system.' 6 9 English courts are therefore reluctant to hold that a foreign
law is contrary to public policy.'7 0 The fact that a foreign relationship is
unknown in English domestic law is not a ground for refusing to recognize
its existence' 7 1 as shown in the recognition of polygamous marriages. A
prominent legal authority has noted that "[a] transaction that is valid by its
foreign lex causae should not be nullified on [public policy grounds] ...
unless its enforcement would offend some moral, social or economic prin-
ciple so sacrosanct in English. eyes as to require its maintenance at all costs
and without exception." 72 In determining whether to recognize a for-
161. DicEY & Mo~aus, supra note 9, at 667-68; see also 8 HALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
478 (4th ed. 1974); WORKING PAPER No. 89, supra note 53, 3.10.
162. DicEy & Momus, supra note 9, at 92; see alsoVervaeke v. Smith, [1983] 1 A.C. 145,
164 (Lord GIaisdale) ("There is abundant authority that an English court will decline to
recognise or apply what would otherwise be the appropriate foreign rule of law when to
do so would be against English public policy."); CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at
113.
163. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 113.
164. Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R-P. & D. at 133.
165. The court may look to prior case law in which English courts have ruled that
marriages between persons of the same-sex are null and void. See supra note 72. Those
cases, however, are distinguishable from the situation here because the marriages in
those cases took place in England where clearly the law did not (and does not) permit
such marriages. Here, the marriage took place in Denmark where the law permits
them.
166. See text supra note 46.
167. See discussion supra part I.B.
168. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 129; Dxc-v & Moius, supra note 9, at 92;
see also Vervaeke v. Smith, [1983] 1 A.C. 145, 164.
169. DicEY & MoRuus, supra note 9, at 92; see also WORKING PAPER No. 89, supra note
53, 1 3.11.
170. DIcEy & MoluIs, supra note 9, at 93.
171. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 129.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
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eign law, English courts look at the results of its enforcement in England
and not at the actual law itself. Ultimately, resolution of a public policy
question thus depends on the nature of the foreign law.173 In the hypo-
thetical under consideration, enforcement of the Partnership Act would
mean the recognition of a same-sex marriage on English soil.
The public policy exception is an intentionally amorphous doc-
trine.' 74 Rather than attempting to identify any clear boundaries, scholars
have instead analyzed the public policy doctrine on a case-by-case basis.' 75
In the context of a Danish same-sex marriage,, the public policy question
pits changing societal norms1 76 and normal conflict of laws rules, on the
one hand,177 against deep rooted homophobia (as expressed in English
law' 7 8) and the long-standing English public policy of sanctioning only
traditional different-sex marriages, on- the other.' 7 9 Thus, an English
court should consider whether progressive developments at home,' 80 in
Europe,' 8 ' and in the United States,' 8 2 indicating an increasing accept-
173. DIcEY & MoRis, supra note 9, at 94.
174. As one scholar commented: "[No attempt to define the limits of that reserva-
tion has ever succeeded." JoHN WES-LAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (7th ed.
1925).
175. See, e.g., DIcEY & Moms, supra note 9, at 92-115; CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note
49, at 113-37.
176. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
177. See discussion supra part IV.B.1.
178. See discussion supra part I.B.
179. See supra text accompanying note 16.
180. While outright hostility towards lesbians and gays was a staple of the Thatcher
years, current Prime Minister John Major announced the lifting of the ban on civil
service recruitment of open lesbians and gay men to top posts. Colin Richardson,
Homosexuality and the Judiciary, 142 NE~v LJ. 130, 131 (1992). Although political atti-
tudes toward lesbian and gay rights appear to be in a state of flux, concrete policy
commitments remain elusive. See id.
181. See discussion supra part II.B.2. The Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Community, however, are not
likely to affect the outcome of the public policy analysis. The Convention presently
provides only minimal protection for lesbian and gay rights under its protection of
privacy. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); Norris v.
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). For a discussion of these cases, see Markus
D. Dubber, Homosexual Privacy Rights Before the United States Supreme Court and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of Methodologies, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 194-99
(1990). For general discussion of the treatment of homosexuals under the Conven-
tion, see Pieter van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals under the Convention on Human
Rights, in HOMOSEXUALrrT. A EUROPEAN COMMUNTY ISSUE 179 (Kees Waaldjk &
Andrew Clapham eds., 1993).
In the EC, the European Court ofJustice has accepted the principles of the Conven-
tion as "forming part of the Community legal order." Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan, 3 Common Mkt. L. Rep. 849 (1991); see also
Clapham & Weiler, supra note 131, at 24. As a result, any practice violating the Conven-
tion, particularly those practices that the Convention's organs specifically have found to
violate the Convention, will ipso facto be prohibited under EC law. Id. There are no
EC provisions, however, explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. For a thorough treatment of the situation of lesbians and gay men in the EC
legal order, see generally id.
182. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
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ance of lesbian and gay rights, are sufficient to warrant recognition of the
Danish same-sex marriage.
English courts should consider whether recognizing a foreign same-
sex marriage is really any different from recognizing a foreign polygamous
marriage. Although English public policy dictates that only monogamous
marriages 8 3 for England's own domiciliaries will be sanctioned, it yields
in cases of foreign polygamous marriages.' 84 Similarly, although English
public policy dictates sanctioning only different-sex marriages for Eng-
land's own domiciliaries, this public policy should also yield to foreign
same-sex marriages. English courts have shown a willingness to depart
from strict traditional marriage principles with foreign polygamous mar-
riages and there is no logical reason to treat foreign same-sex marriages
any differently. It is difficult to argue that a same-sex marriage is more un-
Christian or more untraditional than a polygamous marriage since both
types of marriages violate conventional Christian norms.' 8 5
The court must also query whether the public policy of sanctioning
only different-sex marriages is really so sacrosanct "as to require its mainte-
nance at all costs and without exception." 18 6 Finally, although subsection
11 (c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 only sanctions opposite-sex mar-
riages among English domiciliaries, section 14 of the same act technically
allows recognition of the Danish same-sex marriage. 8 7
Conclusion
An English court forced to determine the legal effect of a Danish same-sex
marriage in. England must take into account two important approaches.
First, the court can look to general conflict of laws rules and legally recog-
nize the Danish marriage. Second, it can resort to the public policy doc-
trine, preempting the general conflict of laws rules, and deny any legal
recognition of the Danish same-sex marriage. The legal framework argua-
bly already exists in English law to allow a court facing such a determina-
tion to reach a just result via conflict of laws rules.
Denmark, an overwhelmingly Christian nation,188 recently made a
marked departure from conventional canon law by enacting the Partner-
ship Act. This legislation foreshadows the status quo of future matrimo-
nial law. If England fails to take appropriate action, it risks falling behind
the standards of its peer "civilized" societies. England can take a giant
stride toward this end by legally recognizing Danish same-sex marriages via
conflict of laws rules as is done with polygamy. There is no logical reason
to treat foreign same-sex marriages differently.
183. This Note also refers to potentially polygamous marriages that are de facto
monogamous marriages. See supra note 12.
184. See discussion supra part I.A.
185. But see discussion supra note 134.
186. CHEsHIRE & NORTH, supra note 49, at 129.
187. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
188. Ninety-two percent of Danes are members of the Lutheran Evangelical Church.
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It must be emphasized, however, that this approach is only second
best. Ideally, England would extend marital rights to its entire population,
regardless of the gender composition of a couple. Respect for civil rights
and human dignity dictates such action. Until England is ready to do this,
however, it must at least respect the choice of other countries who lead the
way.
